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Abstract. Operationalization of terminology for IT applications has revived the 
Wüsterian approach. The conceptual dimension once more prevails after taking 
back seat to specialised lexicography. This is demonstrated by the emergence of 
ontology in terminology. While the Terminology Principles as defined in Fel-
ber’s manual and the ISO standards remain at the core of traditional terminolo-
gy, their computational implementation raises some issues. In this article, while 
reiterating their importance, we will be re-examining these Principles from a 
dual perspective: that of logic in the mathematical sense of the term and that of 
epistemology as in the theory of knowledge. We will thus be clarifying and de-
scribing some of them so as to take into account advances in knowledge engi-
neering (ontology) and formal systems (logic). The notion of ontoterminology, 
terminology whose conceptual system is a formal ontology, results from this 
approach. 
Keywords: Terminology, Terminology principles, ISO standards, ISO 704, 
ISO 1087-1, Knowledge theory, Ontology, Logic, Ontoterminology. 
1 Introduction 
Nowadays, terminology, as an independent discipline, risks being absorbed into 
specialised lexicography or knowledge engineering; the former reducing it to a study 
of linguistic phenomena and the latter, to an issue of computational knowledge repre-
sentation. Nevertheless, terminology as a scientific discipline is crucial if we consider 
that its primary aim is to understand the world, describe the objects that populate it 
and find the right words to talk about them. Although terminology aims to clarify 
communication between humans and not to provide computational models [16], we 
are forced to recognise that it is not entirely satisfactory from the perspective of either 
Logic (by providing consistent definitions), computation (through a conceptual sys-
tem representation) or even in respect of epistemological principles (the essential 
characteristic is no longer a principle in the latest version of the ISO 704 standard 
[2009]). If terminology is to continue to exist as an independent scientific discipline, 
it needs to re-examine its Terminology Principles [29]. 
 
This is not intended as yet another criticism of traditional terminology [15], [7], 
[33]. On the contrary, our contribution is distinctly Wüsterian in its scientific ap-
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proach. The Terminology Manual [10] as well as the ISO 704 standard [16] rightly 
state that Terminology is multidisciplinary and draws support from a number of disci-
plines, e.g. logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, linguistics, etc. Nevertheless a 
lot a work remains to be done in order to really take into account the lessons learnt 
from these disciplines. Furthermore, some current thinking and practices in the field 
of terminology must be integrated into a reviewed version of the ISO 704 standard, in 
particular to take the notion of ontology for terminology into consideration [26], [27], 
[30]. In examining the basic premises of terminology, we would like to demonstrate 
the key role of Logic (terminology is a science), epistemology (essential to under-
standing the world) and, a more recent development, computational models (IT appli-
cations require terminology to be operationalized). To this end, we will study the 
Terminology Principles with respect to conceptual system construction in the de-
manding framework of formal systems1 – while term definition is dealt with using 
natural language, concept definition requires a formal language. We will limit our 
study to the notions of object, concept, characteristic and relation. Insofar as possi-
ble, we will try to understand why certain issues arise and when appropriate, suggest 
more accurate definitions for the Principles. We will also attempt to align its vocabu-
lary with that of Logic and Knowledge engineering, both of which are compulsory 
disciplines nowadays. 
NB: By Terminology Principles, or Principles for short, we mean the study of con-
cepts and their relations. In this article, we refer to the Wüster’s works [40], to the 
Terminology Manual [10] and to the ISO 704 and 1087-1 Standards on Terminology 
[16], [18]. 
2 Reality and Object 
“Producing a terminology requires an understanding of the conceptualization” [16]. 
It means on one hand, understanding the “reality” and on the other, organizing the 
objects that populate it - two different mind operations that are all too often confused. 
We must bear in mind some epistemological principles (see the note at the end of this 
paragraph). One of them is that there are two different kinds of knowledge. “An ob-
ject is defined as anything perceived or conceived” [16]. It defines the first level (and 
first kind) of knowledge2 called individual (or singular) knowledge (object or individ-
ual for short): “Such things are called individuals because each thing is composed of a 
collection of characteristics which can never be the same for another; for the charac-
teristics of Socrates could not be the same for any other particular man” [21] - indi-
vidual must not be confused with singular concept which “is said of only one thing”. 
The second kind of knowledge is conceptual knowledge, concept for short, i.e. 
knowledge about a plurality of things verifying the same law: “which are predicated 
of many things” [21]. Another fundamental epistemological principal is about the 
nature of characteristics, some are essential when others are descriptive. Definition 
                                                            
1 i.e. systems such as Logic with clearly defined syntax and semantics. 
2 We access an object only through a representation. 
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relies on the former whereas description relies on the latter. Let us take the ISO 704 
example of pointing devices in computer hardware [16]. It is evident that “having a 
ball on its underside” and “having colour” have not the same importance and do not 
play the same role in the modelling process. 
 
NB: Most of the “epistemological” quotations are from the “Isagoge” of Porphyry 
[21], a foundation book for every terminologist and knowledge engineer [31]. The 
Isagoge epistemology relies on the principle of difference: “every difference added to 
something modifies it” [Isagoge 8.15-20]. Three kinds of differences are required: 
“Three species of difference have been observed: (1) the separable and (2) the insepa-
rable, and of the latter (2a) the inseparable per se and (2b) the inseparable by acci-
dent” [Isagoge 9.25] The following figure links the principles of terminology and 
knowledge engineering with the various kinds of differences. 
 
Fig. 1. The three kinds of difference 
3 Concept 
“Objects are categorized into classes, which correspond to units of knowledge 
called concepts” [16]. Since “concepts are the basis of all terminological work” [10], 
the first task is to define what we mean by concept. 
 
The ISO 704 standard distinguishes two kinds of concepts. The individual concept 
“which corresponds to only one object” [18] and the general concept “which corre-
sponds to two or more objects which form a group by reason of common properties” 
[18]. Such a distinction is not useful and should be avoided. As a matter of fact a con-
cept is a unit of knowledge which involves a plurality of things whatever the number 
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of objects it depicts (one, two or more, or even zero3). The definition of a concept 
does not depend on the cardinality of its extension. Furthermore, considering any 
unique object as an individual concept4 is not only unnecessary in terminology work 
but it raises several issues. If “Canada” is an individual concept, what are its delimit-
ing characteristics from its generic concept “Country”? Do we need to create a new 
individual concept every time the population of Canada changes? An object is a sub-
ject for predicates (“To be is to be the value of a variable” [22]), not a predicate. It is a 
reification5 of a concept. An individual remains itself in essence in spite of its possi-
ble variations in quality. 
4 Characteristic 
A concept is a “unit of knowledge created by a unique combination of characteris-
tics” [18]. A characteristic is an “abstraction of a property of an object or of a set of 
objects” [18] i.e. a unary predicate on individuals, e.g. “having colour”. Let us notice 
that the “having colour” characteristic implies that there are as many different charac-
teristics as there are particular colours: “is blue”, “is red”, etc.  All these characteris-
tics are independent when they are semantically linked. We will see that a certain kind 
of object properties, those which describe the state of an object, will be more correct-
ly represented in terms of attributes-values pairs or of binary predicates (binary rela-
tions). For example, the “colour” attribute of this optical mouse whose value is “blue” 
corresponds to the following “Colour” binary predicate: 
Colour (thisOpticalMouse, “blue”). 
 
Characteristics play an essential role in terminology: “Characteristics shall be used 
in the analysis of concepts, the modelling of concept systems, and in the formulation 
of definitions” [16]. The standard adds: “Similarities between concepts are indicated 
by shared characteristics; differences that set a concept apart are signalled by delimit-
ing characteristics” knowing that “The same characteristic of a concept may be de-
limiting in relation to one related concept but shared with another related concept.” 
 
It is evident that all characteristics are not equivalent. In the modelling of the point-
ing device system, “having a ball on its underside” and “having colour” have not the 
same importance and do not play the same role in the modelling process. The former 
participates to the nature of the object – it is an essential characteristic – when the 
latter only describes it. Under these conditions, it is surprising that the latest version 
of ISO 704 [16] removed the essential characteristic: a “characteristic which is in-
dispensable to understanding a concept” [17]. The reasons put forward are that “An 
essential characteristic is one of a set of characteristics that is both necessary and 
sufficient to determine the extension of a concept” and “Terminology work is con-
                                                            
3 e.g. "the first man on Mars" whose extension is until now empty. 
4 Singular concept is involved in theories like individuation, meaning and reference, and defi-
nite description. 
5 Called “instance” in knowledge engineering. 
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cerned with the intension and designation of concepts, and in this context necessary, 
sufficient, and essential characteristics are not used.” [16]. But if an essential charac-
teristic is necessary, it is not necessarily sufficient. For example, “mortal” is an essen-
tial characteristic of a “Human being” since if you remove the “mortal” characteristic 
from a “Human being”, he is no longer a “Human being”. Thus “mortal” is necessary, 
but is not sufficient since “Animal” is also mortal. Furthermore, as it is said in the 
same document, “the characteristics making up the intension […] determine the ex-
tension”. So, does it mean that Terminology work does not use characteristics? Of 
course not. The essential characteristic as defined in the previous version of ISO 704 
and in ISO 1087-1 must be reintroduced in a reviewed version of ISO 704. Finally, 
does it imply, as it stated in ISO 1087-1, that a delimiting characteristic is necessarily 
an essential characteristic (“essential characteristic used for distinguishing a concept 
from related concepts”)?  Not necessarily, as we are going to see. 
 
Thus, there are two types of characteristics, those which are essential, i.e. “indis-
pensable to understanding a concept” [18], and those which are not. The definition 
relies on the former whereas the description relies on the latter. 
 
The characteristics which make the subject different are called essential character-
istics: “Differences present per se, then, are comprehended in the definition of the 
substance and make another essence” [Isagoge 9.15]. They are essential in the sense 
that if they are removed from the subject the latter would no longer be what it is. As 
such, they cannot be subjected to “a more or a less”6: the essence does not vary. Es-
sential characteristics define concepts – it is the Aristotelian definition – and organise 
these concepts into a system: “Thus, from essential differences the divisions of genera 
into species arise and definitions are expressed, since they are composed of a genus 
and such differences” [Isagoge 9.-5]. 
 
The characteristics which do not make the subject different but only change its de-
scription are called descriptive characteristics: “but accidental differences are not 
comprehended in the definition of the substance and do not make another essence but 
only a difference in quality” [Isagoge 9.15]. They express valuated knowledge7 
which, whether they are present or absent, they do not change the subject’s essence 
even if they give “a more or a less” complete description of it: “These [accidental] 
differences complete the definition of each thing” [Isagoge 9.20]. 
 
Unlike essential characteristics, descriptive characteristics cannot (should not) be 
represented as unary predicates8. These are attributes with which values are associat-
ed. Attached to objects, these are internal binary relations: “accident is what can be-
                                                            
6 “Differences per se do not permit a more or a less” [Isagoge 9.15-20] 
7 Descriptive knowledge subject to “a more or a less”: “accidental differences […] include 
increase and decrease” [Isagoge 9.15-20], e.g. “being coloured”. 
8 A descriptive characteristic puts in relation an individual and a value. It requires a binary 
predicate (binary relation), e.g. the white colour of my computer mouse will be represented 
by the following expression: Colour (myMouse, white). 
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long or not belong to the same thing […] but always exist in a substratum” [Isagoge 
13.5]. More than anything else, the object is a prop for attributes. 
  
Fig. 2. The ISO 704 Computer mouse example 
In the field of knowledge engineering, more emphasis is laid on describing objects 
than on understanding them. The values linked to attributes constitute a number of 
specific determinations of the object. In modelling stirrers in chemistry, “agitating 
capacity”, “speed range” or “medium’s maximum viscosity” are examples of attrib-
utes. 
 
This difference between the characteristics is fundamental.  As we have just seen, 
it expresses knowledge of a different nature. Essential characteristics define and 
structure concepts. Those which are not, describe objects and, based on the values 
linked to them, the various states in which these objects may exist. We shall use the 
name attributes for these descriptive characteristics so as to remain in line with the 
vocabulary of knowledge representation. 
 
ISO standards also introduce the concept of type of characteristics to designate 
characteristics serving as subdivision criteria: “category of characteristics which 
serves as the criterion of subdivision when establishing concept systems” [18]. Be-
yond the issue of barely convincing examples (in many circumstances, “colour” 
would appear to be more of a quality, i.e. a valuated attribute, than a subdivision crite-
rion), we come up against the issue of managing these characteristics: Are they exclu-
sive? Can they be combined? How do they spread through generic relation? etc. So 
many questions which require a logical specification of the terminological paradigms. 
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5 Relation 
“Concepts do not exist as isolated units of thought but always in relation to each 
other" [16]. The Principles and the ISO standards distinguish between two types of 
relation between concepts: hierarchical relations grouping together generic and parti-
tive relations, and associative relations. The former play a central role insofar as they 
order the conceptual system and thus enable us to understand and master its complexi-
ty: science is the ordering of reality. The latter express a connection considered non 
hierarchical between concepts “by virtue of experience” [18] such as relations involv-
ing a cause and its effect, producer and product, etc. 
 
Fig. 3. The Porphyry’s Tree of Relation9 
5.1 Generic relation 
Two concepts are connected by a generic relation if the intension of the first, 
named superordinate concept and more exactly generic concept, is included in the 
intension of the second, named subordinate concept and more exactly specific con-
cept, and if the latter comprises at least one additional delimiting characteristic: “rela-
tion between two concepts where the intension of one of the concepts includes that of 
the other concept and at least one additional delimiting characteristic” [18]. This rela-
tion is irreflexive10, asymmetric11 and transitive12. It therefore defines a strict order - a 
                                                            
9 Built with OCW (Ontology Craft Workbench), an environment for building ontology defined 
by specific differentiation (© C.Roche, University of Savoie). 
10 Let SCh be the set of characterics, SCp the set of concepts and > the generic relation defined 
( ⊆ ) in the Cartesian product SCp×SCp. Saying that C1 is a generic concept of C2, i.e. (C1, 
C2) ∈ >, will be expressed by C1>C2. Irreflexive means that a concept can not be subordi-
nated (or superordinated) to itself since a delimiting characteristic is required: 
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hierarchy - among concepts which is not total insofar as some concepts may not be 
comparable. Intension and extension are opposites: the extension of a specific concept 
is included in the extensions of its generic concepts: “genera have more by containing 
their subordinate species, while species in their proper differences have more than 
their genera” [Isagoge 15.20]. 
 
Let us notice that since a concept is defined by a unique combination of character-
istics, each element of a partition13 of this set of characteristics potentially defines a 
generic concept: the ISO generic relation is poly-hierarchical14. Then which superor-
dinate concept immediately above must be used in the intensional definition? 
5.2 Partitive relation 
It is often easier to describe a thing as it is perceived, as it appears to us given its 
components, than to define it as it is (its nature). The partitive (part-of) or merological 
relation therefore plays an important role. It expresses an internal relation between a 
whole, the comprehensive concept, and its components, the partititive concepts, with-
out entailing any particular constraints regarding the nature of its constituents. The 
Principles and the ISO standards qualify the partitive relation as hierarchical in order 
to convey the idea that a thing may be understood at increasingly detailed and encom-
passing levels. However, the partitive relation does not define an order15. There is no 
subordination of a component to the whole, in the way that a species is subordinate to 
a genus. If what is stipulated for the genus is also stipulated for its species, this is not 
the case for either the whole regarding its components or on the contrary for its com-
ponents regarding the whole encompassing them. 
 
Considering the partitive relation as a defining and not merely descriptive relation 
raises numerous issues. This entails the risk of confusing the comprehensive concept's 
characteristics with its partitive concepts. Even if one can identify “essential” (in the 
sense of compulsory) and distinctive components (which would differentiate two 
comprehensive concepts), a partitive concept is not a characteristic – in general, a 
concept is not a characteristic and by the same token, a characteristic is not a con-
cept16. 
                                                                                                                                               
 ∀  C   ∈ SCp, ¬  (C > C)  
11  ∀  C1, C2   ∈ SCp, (C1 > C2)   →   ¬  (C2 > C1) 
12  ∀  C1, C2, C3 ∈ SCp, C1 > C2   and   C2 > C3 → C1 > C3  
13 A partition of a set S is a set of non-empty subsets of S such that the union of the subsets is 
equal to S and the intersection of any two subsets is empty. For example, if the concept C is 
defined by the set of characteristics {c1, c2, c3}, each element of the partition 
{{c1,c2},{c3}} potentially defines a generic concept  
14 Unlike the generic relation created by the genus–differentia definition 
15 To postulate the transitivity of the part-of relation would vanish the hierarchical levels. 
16 Even if one would like to be able to designate the set of objects having a specific characteris-
tic. This is quite another issue for which Logic provides an elegant solution (see § 7 and 8). 
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5.3 Associative relation 
Associative relations are external relations between concepts (external in the sense 
that they are not necessary to the understanding of the connected concepts) non hier-
archical (neither generic nor partitive) by “virtue of experience” [18]. In principle, 
they do not entail any constraints regarding the nature of connected concepts. Asso-
ciative relations are binary relations, which entails translating relations of greater 
arity into a set of dyadic relations. 
 
ISO 1087-1 standard gives some examples of associative relations: sequential, 
temporal and causal relations. The absence of delimiting characteristics in the defini-
tion of these relations is regrettable (the figure 3 is a proposal). They could have dis-
sipated certain ambiguities. For instance, is a causal relation also sequential? The 
given examples suggest this (“action” and “reaction”, “nuclear explosion” and “fall-
out”). 
5.4 Ontological relations 
The term “ontology” does not appear in the ISO 704 and 1087-1 standards. The 
Terminology manual [10] speaks of ontological relations to designate indirect rela-
tions between concepts and in particular, partitive (merological) relations. 
 
Ontology does not mean the same thing in knowledge engineering which defines it 
as a formal specification of concepts and their relations17 [13], [14], [25], [35], [37]. 
The most important relation is therefore that of subsumption (generic relation) where 
terminology [10] speaks of a logical relation (logical subordination). Given that now-
adays, ontology constitutes a theme in itself and is one of the most promising oppor-
tunities for modelling and computational representation of the conceptual system of a 
terminology [26], [30], we suggest using the word ontology in the accepted, 
knowledge-engineering sense. All the more so given that objects cannot be connected 
until they have been defined, i.e. until the ontology in the etymological sense of the 
term has been constructed. 
6 Definition 
According to the Principles, definitions are “representations of a concept” [18] and 
“should reflect the concept system” [16]. Definitions would apparently create18 nei-
                                                            
17 The first and etymological meaning of ontology is “the science of being as being inde-
pendently of its particular determinations”. This definition is closer to the one given by 
knowledge engineering – even if there is some confusion between “beingness” and “exist-
ence” – than terminology. 
18 To be compared with the creation of species by its definition in terms of genus and specific 
difference (the genus-differentia definition). 
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ther concepts – these are created by a “unique combination of characteristics19 ” – nor 
the concept system. Definitions are made afterwards when unique combinations of 
characteristics have been put together and relations identified. 
 
Here we distinguish two types of definition, intensional and extensional. 
6.1 Intensional definition 
Intensional definition, similar to a definition in terms of genus and difference, 
comprises the superordinate concept immediately above followed by one or several 
delimiting characteristics. Yet since the same concept may be directly subordinated to 
several concepts, which one should be chosen20? The fact that different definitions 
may lead to a same unique combination of characteristics is not a problem in itself. 
The Principles also require specification of the characteristics distinguishing a con-
cept from its coordinate concepts. The advantage of this requirement is even less ob-
vious given that the delimiting characteristics of coordinate concepts with respect to 
their common superordinate concept automatically distinguishes the coordinate con-
cepts from each other21 (or at least should do in a well-thought out conceptualisation 
system). 
 
Definitions based on a partitive or associative relation are not satisfactory from a 
formal perspective inasmuch as the development of the unique combination of charac-
teristics defining the concept thus created is not clearly determined. What does a de-
limiting characteristic indicate in the case of a partitive relation? Can the combina-
tions of characteristics of a whole and its components be compared? Of components 
with each other? Of comprehensive concepts with each other within their structure? 
6.2 Extensional definition 
The extensional definition of a generic or comprehensive concept consists in enu-
merating all its subordinate concepts (specific in the case of a generic concept, parti-
tive for a comprehensive concept). This type of definition must not be confused with 
the “extensional definition” of a set (respectively to a concept) in mathematics which 
consists in enumerating the objects comprising that set (respectively belonging to the 
concept). For this reason, we will also refer to “enumerational definition” to avoid any 
confusion. 
 
While the advantage of this type of definition is understandable, it immediately 
raises the issue of the unique combination of characteristics identifying the concept 
                                                            
19 It should be specified however that while each unique combination of characteristics creates 
a concept, this does not necessarily entail a meaning concerning field. 
20 In other words, let C1, C2 and C3 ∈ SCp with C1={a}, C2={b}, C3={a, b}. C1 and C2 are 
two generic concepts immediately above C3 and produce two different definitions of  C3. 
21 Which is what the Aristotelian definition does with genus and specific difference. 
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thus defined. How can it be created based on the combinations of characteristics of 
subordinated concepts? 
6.3 Definition versus Description 
It is important to bear in mind that partitive and associative relations more describe 
object than define concept. To close this chapter on definition, let us quote ces Mes-
sieurs de Port-Royal about their “definition of definition” which illustrates how epis-
temology and logic, as well as distinguishing essential characteristics from descriptive 
characteristics, are useful: “There are two kinds of definitions: the more exact one, 
which retains the name definition, and the other, less exact, which is called a descrip-
tion. The more exact definition explains the nature of a thing by its essential attrib-
utes, of which the common one is called the genus, and the proper one the difference. 
The less exact definition, called a description, provides some knowledge of a thing in 
terms of the accidents that are proper to it and determine it enough to give us an idea 
distinguishing it from other things” [2]. 
7 Logical relation 
Extensional (enumerational) definition of a generic concept calls to mind the Ter-
minology manual’s concept disjunction [10] – defined in this particular case on the 
basis of concept extensions. The latter raises identical issues relating to the determina-
tion of the characteristics of the generic concept thus created. But it is the same idea: 
the possibility of building new concepts on the basis of existing concepts, be they 
generic, specific or comprehensive. Concept conjunction, non-existent in ISO stand-
ards, is interesting from this point of view. However, defining the resulting specific 
concept’s intension as the combination of intensions entails certain contradictions. 
How could we interpret a concept stemming from the conjunction of two coordinate 
concepts (i.e. stemming from a same generic concept) which would be differentiated 
by a delimiting characteristic (is it possible to be a thing and its opposite at one and 
the same time?)? 
 
Nevertheless, Logic should be introduced in Terminology. Concepts, characteris-
tics and attributes are logical predicates (unary for the first two and binary for the last 
one). Such predicates allow to classify22 objects into different sets which may be dis-
tinct, overlap each other or included. Then it is possible to define classes23 gathering 
                                                            
22 We distinguish conceptualisation whose aim is to understand the “reality” by defining con-
cepts from classification whose goal is structuring objects into classes. 
23 If a concept can be interpreted as a set (its extension in the mathematical sense, i.e. the set of 
the subsumed objects), every set does not correspond to a concept. We introduce the notion 
of class in order to express this distinction: concept subsumes individuals of same nature 
when class gathers objects verifying the same property whatever their nature or structure.  
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individuals verifying the same logical property independently of their nature or struc-
ture24. 
8 Conclusion and Perspectives 
The Terminology Principles rightly emphasise the importance of field conceptuali-
sation as the basis of terminology – terminology cannot exist without specialised 
knowledge. However, creating the concept system is challenging. Especially because 
knowledge which is often tacit and rarely described in scientific and technical docu-
ments, needs to be explained, making experts’ participation in and contribution to 
work on terminology absolutely essential [28]. To help us with this task, the Princi-
ples propose a certain number of paradigms demonstrating a scientific ambition to 
order reality – a mathematical structuralism – based on connected concept systems. 
 
However, inaccuracies in these paradigms' definition make terminology operation-
alization difficult and explain knowledge engineering’s leader status in this field – 
from the computational perspective alone, the Principles need to be re-examined. 
Defining the Principles should be done with the same meticulousness as these very 
Principles are intended to apply to ordering reality. Using a formal language with 
clearly defined syntax and semantics is inevitable not only to eliminate any ambigui-
ties but also because conceptualisation is a scientific activity. Representation lan-
guages stemming from artificial intelligence will ultimately lead to terminology oper-
ationalization on the basis of a logical specification of the concept system, in the same 
spirit of formalisation and accuracy but using a different, complementary register. 
 
Logic [3] and artificial intelligence languages [34], [4] are primarily representation 
systems. Their purpose is not to understand25 the world but to describe it, formally in 
the case of the former and for computation in the case of the latter. Their use in the 
framework of concept system construction should be based on epistemological prin-
ciples which remain to be specified. These principles should be determined with this 
objective of formalism and operationalization in mind. To conclude, we shall suggest 
a few possibilities for achieving this aim. 
 
                                                            
24 For example, Red(x) = { x / Couleur (x, red) } gathers all the objects, whatever their nature 
(concept) and structure (attributes) since they own an attribute “colour” whose value is 
“red”, e.g. my uncle’s Ferrari, the apple of my today lunch, etc. Let us notice that the logical 
property “Couleur (x, red)” is an essential property of the set (its intensional definition) but 
not of its members. 
25 As with all languages, formal languages divide reality according to their own particular struc-
tures. First-order logic achieves this in terms of predicates to which formally defined calcu-
lations are applied (predicate calculation). However, such a language cannot directly trans-
late certain fundamental differences. It uses the same formalism to represent both essential 
(for example Man(x)) and accidental (Sick(x)) characteristics. 
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Grasping the variety of objects comprising reality is possible on the basis of the no-
tion of concept as a unit of understanding. To this end, its function would be dual: that 
of understanding what a thing is and that of describing it. The former defines the thing 
in terms of essential characteristics26. The latter describes it as a unique piece of 
knowledge in the form of valuated attributes27, 28. Essential characteristics are born of 
reason. They participate in the definition of concepts and organise them into a system 
– a skeleton – on which are hung the attributes describing the objects as they are per-
ceived and whose values express contingent knowledge. Definition and description 
are two notions which it is important to differentiate. They are found in the typology 
of relations below (fig. 4). Definitions are not limited to subsequently giving expres-
sion to a structure built beforehand. In the same operation, they create29,30 both the 
concepts and the structure (the conceptual system). 
 
Fig. 4. A typology of relations 
While every object belongs to a concept31, it may also be related to different clas-
ses32. Like the concept, the class is a unit of knowledge concerning a plurality of 
                                                            
26 A characteristic is considered essential for an object if, on removing it, the object is no longer 
what it is. 
27 Contrary to an essential characteristic, removing an attribute from an object does not change 
its nature, it only means it is incompletely described.  
28 We prefer the expression “valuated attribute” to “inherent characteristic” (used in the vo-
cabulary of traditional terminology) so as to emphasise that which is descriptive or contin-
gent in the object. 
29 Provided we consider that a concept’s definition is constructed with respect to previously 
defined concepts, more knowable than the definiendum. 
30 Unlike a definition in natural language which is rather a linguistic explanation, a formal 
definition is a constructive definition which creates an entity which can be manipulated (in 
formal and/or computational systems).  
31 to one concept corresponding to the object’s essence (from a given point of view). 
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things. It is however different insofar as the objects it brings together may be of dif-
ferent nature (concept) or of different structure (attribute) as long as they obey the 
same law. The notion of concept is enhanced by that of logical predicate. It is no 
longer limited to a unique combination of characteristics but becomes a truth-value 
function. The concept is predicative [11], as well as characteristic and attribute: Logic 
is the key. Those predicates can then be combined in an infinite number of ways, 
through conjunction (allowing a kind of “poly-hierarchy”), disjunction, negation etc. 
to define a new class as a well-formed formula.  
 
The appearance of new paradigms expresses the desire to incorporate all the differ-
ent sources tapped by terminology. Thus, ontoterminology [27], a terminology whose 
concept system is a formal ontology, emphasises the importance of the epistemologi-
cal principles governing field conceptualisation – this is the primary definition of 
ontology. It also emphasises the necessity of a scientific approach to terminology 
where the expert plays a key role – it involves ontology in its latest definitions where 
logic and knowledge representation languages are dominant factors. And lastly, it 
connects the terms (of usage and standardised) to the conceptual model, while distin-
guishing the term definitions in natural language (linguistic explanations) from con-
cepts’ formal definitions (logical specifications). 
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